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Lawyers commonly find that a rule of law can 
attach specific effects to an existing legal status 
or relationship. When a court or an administra­
tive authority is required to take a decision on a 
legal question involving the application of such 
a rule, it may be required to take first a decision 
on the presupposed status or relationship, if  its 
existence or validity is disputed. In such circum­
stances, it is common to say that the decision on 
the ‘main’ question (ie the main object of the 
decision) depends on the decision of a ‘prelim­
inary’ or ‘incidental question’ (question préal-
able in French, Vorfrage in German).
Take, for example, a contentious → succes­
sion case in which a court is required to take a 
decision on the division of the estate among the 
heirs. If  the applicable rules on intestate suc­
cession confer to the surviving spouse the right 
to a part of the estate, it may be that the exist­
ence or validity of the deceased’s → marriage is 
disputed: this is the case if  some other poten­
tial heirs allege that the marriage was null and 
void or that it had been terminated by a divorce 
(→ Divorce and personal separation). In such a 
case, the question of the existence and validity 
of the marriage is not the main object of the 
proceedings; nevertheless the court will have to 
decide this issue incidentally in order to deter­
mine whether the surviving spouse can inherit 
part of the estate.
In some cases, the decision on the main ques­
tion may depend on an incidental question, 
which hinges in turn on another incidental 
question (Vor- Vorfrage). This is for instance the 
case if  the rules on intestate succession grant 
some heirship rights to the deceased’s children, 
but distinguish between children born during 
the marriage and outside the marriage. If  the 
legitimacy of a child is in dispute, this is an 
incidental question. However, it may be that the 
decision on this incidental question depends on 
another (logically preliminary) incidental ques­
tion: that of the existence of a valid marriage 
between the child’s parents.
When the situation is purely domestic, inci­
dental questions do not raise any private 
international law issue. The decision on the inci­
dental question – like the decision on the main 
question – depends solely on the domestic rules 
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of the → lex fori. Normally, the rules applic­
able to the main question simply refer, for the 
decision on the incidental question, to the rules, 
which would govern this question if  it had been 
the main object of separate proceedings. Thus, 
the validity of a marriage for the purpose of 
a succession is normally decided based on the 
same rules which would govern proceedings for 
the annulment of the marriage. However, it may 
also be that special rules govern the disputed 
issue when it arises as an incidental question. 
Thus, the rules on so­ called ‘putative marriage’ 
(as provided for in several jurisdictions) are 
nothing other than special rules extending some 
specific effects or benefits of marriage to per­
sons who entered, in good faith, into an invalid 
marriage. In any case, in the absence of for­
eign elements, the choice between these differ­
ent ways of deciding on the incidental question 
depends solely on domestic law and no issue of 
private international law arises.
If  the situation is international, the law 
applicable to the main question is determined 
by the choice­ of­ law rules of the forum. These 
may designate the lex fori or a foreign law 
(the foreign lex causae). In the first case, it is 
undisputed that the solution of the incidental 
question will also depend on the rules of the 
forum, including, where appropriate, its private 
international law rules. Thus, if  the inciden­
tal question – unlike the main question – does 
not involve any international element, it seems 
obvious that it should be decided pursuant the 
domestic rules of the → lex fori. If  the inciden­
tal question has an international dimension, its 
solution will depend on the private international 
law rules of the forum; these may be choice­ of­ 
law rules or recognition rules, depending on the 
circumstances of the case. Thus, if  the inciden­
tal question has been decided with res judicata 
effect by a foreign court, and this decision is 
recognized in the forum, the recognition rules 
of the forum will dictate the solution, thus pre­
vailing over its choice of rules. By contrast, if  
the incidental question was not decided with res 
judicata effect, or if  the foreign decision is not 
recognized in the forum, this question will have 
to be decided in conformity with the law desig­
nated by the choice­ of­ law rules of the forum.
When the main question is purely domestic, 
but the incidental question is not, the solution 
also depends on the choice­ of­ law and recogni­
tion rules of the lex fori.
From a private international law perspective, 
the controversial problem involving the incidental 
question only arises when, under the choice­ of­ law 
rules of the forum, the main question is governed 
by a foreign law. In such a case, the issue arises 
as to whether the incidental question should be 
decided in accordance with the law of the forum 
(including where appropriate its choice­ of­ law and 
recognition rules) or by reference to the lex causae 
(including where appropriate its choice­ of­ law or 
recognition rules). In the German legal literature, 
which first tackled the problem (George Melchior, 
Die Grundlagen des deutschen internationalen 
Privatrechts (De Gruyter 1932)  245 ff; Wilhelm 
Wengler, ‘Die Vorfrage im Kollisionsrecht’ (1934) 
8 RabelsZ 148), the ‘lex fori approach’ was tradi­
tionally described as an ‘independent connection’ 
(‘selbständige Anknüpfung’) and the ‘lex causae 
approach’ as a ‘dependent connection’ (‘unselb-
ständige Anknüpfung’). This is the ‘problem of the 
incidental question’ in private international law. 
There is a clear divide among scholars on this 
issue, but intermediate or ‘agnostic’ solutions have 
also been proposed.
National courts only rarely take a clear stand 
on this issue. From a comparative perspective, 
the ‘lex fori approach’ seems to be preponder­
ant, at least in certain countries (in → France, 
see the decision of the Cour de Cassation of 
22 April 1986, Djenangi), but important deci­
sions have been taken based on the opposite 
approach (see the well­ known decision of the 
Ontario Court of Appeal of 4 November 1963, 
Schwebel v Ungar, 42 DLR (2d) 622).
Contrary to one author’s view (Wilhelm 
Wengler, ‘Die Vorfrage im Kollisionsrecht’ (1934) 
8 RabelsZ 149), the incidental question is not sim­
ply a question of construction of the legal con­
cept used by a rule of law. In the examples above, 
there might well be a problem of construction of 
the rules of the foreign lex causae. For instance, 
the effects of the annulment of the marriage on 
the inheritance rights of the deceased’s spouse 
could be disputed. This is simply a question 
of construction of the legal notion of ‘spouse’ 
as used by the rules on intestate succession of 
the foreign succession law. Once it is clear that 
a ‘spouse’ loses his/ her inheritance rights when 
the marriage is void, the question may arise as to 
whether the marriage is valid or not. This is the 
incidental question. As mentioned above, it con­
cerns the validity of the legal status or relation­
ship, on which the effects of the rules on intestate 
succession depend (Torben Svenné Schmidt, 
‘The Incidental Question in Private international 
law’ (1992) 233 Collected Courses of the Hague 
Academy of International Law 305, 324).
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According to a traditional understanding 
of the problem, the alternative is between the 
‘application’ of the choice­ of­ law rules of the 
forum and the ‘application’ of the choice­ of­ 
law rules of the lex causae. However, as rightly 
emphasized (Paolo Picone, ‘La méthode de 
la reference à lordre juridique competent en 
droit international privé’ (1986) 197 Collected 
Courses of the Hague Academy of International 
Law 229, 307 et seq), if  the ‘independent’ 
approach consists indeed of the application 
of the private international rules of the forum, 
the ‘dependent’ approach should be more aptly 
described as based on a ‘reference’ to the solu­
tion of the incidental question under the legal 
system of the lex causae as a whole (in Italian 
riferimento all’ordinamento competente). As a 
matter of fact, the solution of the incidental 
question under the lex causae does not neces­
sarily depend on its choice­ of­ law rules but can 
result from other rules of that legal system, 
in particular from its rules on the recognition 
of foreign decisions or from other principles 
on the recognition of foreign legal status and 
relationships in that country. In such a case, 
it would be improper to consider ‘under a lex 
causae approach’ that the foreign recognition 
rules or principles should be ‘applied’ in the 
forum state:  it is self­ evident that foreign rec­
ognition rules are never ‘applied’ by foreign 
courts. More exactly, if  a dependent approach 
is adopted, the lex causae is taken into account 
as a whole with the consequence that the solu­
tion given under that law to the incidental ques­
tion is accepted (‘imported’) as such in the legal 
system of the forum.
II. Conditions of the incidental  
question problem
As mentioned above, the logical conditions of 
the private international law problem of the 
incidental question are that (i)  the main ques­
tion is governed by a foreign lex causae and (ii) 
the application of a substantive law rule of this 
law requires a decision on an incidental legal 
question.
From a practical point of view, other condi­
tions must also be fulfilled. In particular, for 
the alternative between the → lex fori approach 
and the lex causae approach to become relevant 
in concreto, it is also necessary (iii) that the two 
approaches lead to diverging decisions on the 
incidental question. This is the case when the 
choice­ of­ law rules of the lex fori designate, as 
applicable to the incidental question, a law that 
is different from the one that would be appli­
cable under the lex causae, provided that the 
substantive rules of the designated laws also 
lead to different results. A conflict can also 
arise when the incidental question had already 
been decided by a judgment having res judicata 
effects in the forum but not recognized in the lex 
causae state, or vice versa. By contrast, a ‘false 
conflict’ arises when the choice­ of­ law rules of 
both the lex fori and the lex causae designate 
the same law as governing the incidental ques­
tion, or when the substantive rules of the des­
ignated laws lead to the same result, or when 
a previous decision on the incidental question 
is recognized with similar effects in both states 
concerned.
It has been rightly argued (Paolo Picone, 
‘La méthode de la reference à l’ordre juridique 
competent en droit international privé’ (1986) 
197 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of 
International Law 229, 304) that a further con­
dition for the problem to arise is (iv) that the lex 
causae designated by the choice­ of­ law rules of 
the forum as applicable to the main question is 
also applicable to this question under the choice­ 
of­ law rules of the lex causae. In abstracto, this 
condition is not required because, from the 
perspective of the forum state, the alternative 
between the ‘independent’ and the ‘dependent’ 
connection of the incidental question can arise 
irrespective of the law that is applicable to the 
main question under the lex causae. However, 
the most weighty arguments for the lex causae 
approach – which are, as we will see, the uni­
formity of decisions between the → lex fori and 
the lex causae and the consistent application of 
the foreign lex causae as a whole – are devoid of 
their substance if  the main question itself  is not 
governed by the same law in the two states con­
cerned. Therefore, the alternative between the 
two approaches mentioned will only become 
relevant when the choice­ of­ law rules of both 
the lex fori and the lex causae provide for the 
application of the substantive rules of the lex 
causae to the main question. In the examples 
above, it is necessary, for instance, that the suc­
cession (main question) is governed, both in 
state A (forum) and in state B, by the law of 
state B (lex causae).
Of course, this does not necessarily imply 
that both states apply the same → connecting 
factor, since the application of one and the 
same law to the main question can also result 
from different choice­ of­ law rules, as well as 
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from the adoption, in at least one of the states 
concerned, of the → renvoi doctrine.
In the following section, we will review some 
of the arguments that are most often put for­
ward in favour of  the lex fori approach and 
the lex causae approach. Many of  these consid­
erations play an important role, but we believe 
that none of  them can justify, in general terms, 
an a priori choice in favour of  one or the other 
of  the two proposed solutions. Nevertheless, 
in some circumstances, some of these argu­
ments clearly plead in favour of  one solution 
or the other. In other cases, they just give use­
ful indications for a decision to be taken on a 
case­ by­ case basis.
III. The main arguments for a lex fori  
approach (independent connection)
The → lex fori approach is the solution that 
courts of most countries tend to adopt sponta­
neously, in the absence of particular grounds. 
As mentioned above, the problem of the inci­
dental question arises when the decision of 
the main question depends on the existence or 
validity of a certain legal status or relationship 
involving some foreign elements. If  this issue 
were to be decided as the main object of the 
proceedings, it would be decided in accordance 
with the choice­ of­ law rules of the forum. The 
first reflex of the courts is normally to resort to 
these same choice­ of­ law rules, even when that 
question arises incidentally.
Indeed, this instinctive reaction seeks to safe­
guard consistency within the domestic legal 
order. The strong interest of each country in the 
consistency of all decisions, which are taken (or 
could be taken) in those countries with regard 
to the existence or validity of a particular legal 
status or relationship, cannot be denied. Now, 
if  a ‘dependent’ connection were preferred, the 
decision on the incidental question – based on 
the choice­ of­ law or recognition rules of the lex 
causae – could differ from the decision that a 
court of the forum state would take based on the 
conflict rules of the forum if the same question 
arose as the main object of separate proceed­
ings. Moreover, the decision on the incidental 
question based on the lex causae approach could 
also differ from the decision, which the forum 
courts would take if  the same question arose 
incidentally in proceedings relating to a different 
main question, governed by a distinct lex causae 
(eg the question of a marriage validity could 
be answered differently depending on whether 
the main question turns on the spouses’ capacity 
to remarry or their inheritance rights) (Pierre 
Mayer, ‘Le phénomène de la coordination des 
ordres juridiques étatiques en droit privé’ (2007) 
327 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy 
of International Law 9, 335 et seq). This leads 
to uncertainty. By contrast, if  the courts always 
apply the law designated by the forum choice­ 
of­ law rules, the decision on the disputed ques­
tion should always be the same, irrespective of 
whether it arises as the main question or as an 
incidental question.
The consistency argument is reinforced by 
the following consideration. Each legal status 
and relationship consists of a body of rights 
and effects of which that status or relationship 
cannot be completely devoid. If  the choice­ of­ 
law rules of the forum recognize the existence 
and validity of such a status or relationship by 
referring to a certain law, it would be contra­
dictory to deny this status or relationship all of 
its consequences by systematically referring to 
a different law when its effects are at stake. It 
does not make sense to consider that a marriage 
is valid if  it produces no effects with regard to 
the relationships between the spouses and vis­ 
à­ vis the children and the → succession. As 
it has been rightly pointed out, such a para­
doxical conclusion would also be problematic 
from a human rights perspective: thus, under 
art 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (European Convention of 4 November 
1950 for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, 213 UNTS 221), 
respect for the family life implies that a fam­
ily status or relationship is recognized with its 
concrete effects (Andreas Bucher, ‘La dimen­
sion sociale du droit international privé’ (2009) 
341 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of 
International Law 9, 246).
These arguments are certainly very strong, 
but they are not always decisive. Inconsistent 
decisions on the same issue can also be ren­
dered in purely domestic cases. This possibility 
is tolerated in all legal systems within the limits 
of res judicata. Now, res judicata is a relative 
principle, which only covers decisions rendered 
on the same question between the same par­
ties. Moreover, decisions rendered on incidental 
questions are normally not covered by res judi-
cata, which means that they can co­ exist within 
the same legal system with contradictory deci­
sions on the same question. Nevertheless, this 
is in practice a relatively rare occurrence. It is 
certainly true that some inconsistencies can be 
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more broadly accepted in international situa­
tions, but they should be avoided unless justi­
fied by very serious reasons.
Internal consistency is very important, but its 
weight varies depending on the circumstances 
of the case. First, one should distinguish the 
instances, where the res judicata principle con­
trols. This is generally the case when the inci­
dental question was already decided as the main 
question in previous proceedings between the 
same parties. For example, if  we assume that 
the deceased’s marriage has been declared null 
and void by a final judgment in the forum state, 
the court seized with the same question as an 
incidental question is bound by res judicata and 
should therefore not be allowed to render an 
inconsistent decision based on the lex causae.
The same is also true when the same ques­
tion, raised incidentally in previous proceedings 
concerning a different question, was decided 
with res judicata effect in conformity with the 
applicable procedural rules. Thus, in certain 
legal orders, one of the parties can require an 
incidental question to be decided with res judi-
cata effect (eg ‘Zwischenfeststellungsklage’ in → 
Germany, ‘accertamento costitutivo’ in → Italy). 
In some systems, all questions relating to the 
existence of a → personal status must always be 
decided with res judicata effect, irrespective of 
whether they constitute the main object of the 
proceedings or an incidental question (Italy).
Of course, the preclusive effect of res judi-
cata not only attaches to previous judgments 
rendered in the forum, but also to foreign judg­
ments duly recognized in the forum. Thus, if  
the nullity of the deceased’s marriage has been 
declared by a foreign judgment recognized in 
the forum, the forum courts will be bound by 
that judgment when they have to decide on the 
spouse’s inheritance rights.
Even if  the now incidentally disputed ques­
tion was not yet decided in previous proceedings, 
the need for internal consistency is controlling 
when, in the pending proceedings, the incidental 
question must be decided with res judicata effect 
according to the rules of civil procedure of the 
forum. Since, in this case, the court’s decision 
on the incidental question will also be binding 
with respect to future proceedings, it seems that 
it should not be based on the law governing 
the main question in the pending proceedings, 
but on the law designated by the choice­ of­ law 
rules of the forum (Carmen Christina Bernitt, 
Die Anknüpfung von Vorfragen im europäischen 
Kollisionsrecht (Mohr Siebeck 2010) 72 et seq).
Besides the cases where the decision on the 
incidental question is (or will be) covered by 
res judicata, the need for internal consistency is 
particularly stringent when the legal status or 
relationship, which is the object of the inciden­
tal question, was validly created or constituted 
in the forum (Paul Lagarde, ‘La règle de conflit 
applicable aux questions préalables’ [1960] Rev.
crit.DIP 459, 481). This is for instance the case 
when a marriage was celebrated in the forum 
or an adoption constituted through a local 
decree. In such a case, it is very unlikely that the 
local courts will give priority to the foreign lex 
causae, when this leads to an invalidity decision.
The same is probably true when the legal sta­
tus or relationship was created abroad, but its 
recognition in the forum is imposed by some 
higher principles of European or international 
law. Based on well­ known case­law of the 
European Court of Justice regarding the effects 
of freedom of movement on the recognition of 
a person’s name attributed abroad (Case C­ 148/ 
02 Carlos Garcia Avello v Belgian State [2003] 
ECR I­ 11613; Case C­ 353/ 06 Stefan Grunkin and 
Dorothee Regina Paul [2008] ECR I­ 7639), it is 
now widely accepted that other kinds of legal 
status or relationships legally constituted under 
the law of a Member State (such as marriage 
or filiation) also benefit from recognition in the 
other Member States, under certain (although 
not yet entirely settled) conditions (Andreas 
Bucher, ‘La dimension sociale du droit interna­
tional privé’ (2009) 341 Collected Courses of the 
Hague Academy of International Law 9, 359 et 
seq). The same is also true with respect to cer­
tain principles of the European Human Rights 
Convention, such as the protection of family life 
(art 8 ECHR). When such principles are appli­
cable in the forum, the local authorities will not 
be allowed to deny recognition to the relevant 
foreign legal status or relationship, even if this 
is not valid under the lex causae governing the 
main question.
Apart from these cases, internal consistency 
does not always seem to be conclusive for the 
decision on the incidental question. Nevertheless, 
it still is a significant consideration, which should 
be balanced against the factors militating for a 
lex causae approach.
To this effect, the need for internal consist­
ency will carry more weight when the choice­ 
of­ law rules of the forum submit the incidental 
question to the substantive law of the forum, 
and in particular when this is the result of spe­
cific policy considerations.
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Another relevant factor is the more or less 
close connection existing between the main 
question and the incidental question. As it was 
frequently pointed out, a legal status or rela­
tionship frequently produces some ‘natural’ 
effects, which are part of its core, but also other 
‘side­ effects’ which are perceived as not belong­
ing to the essence (Andreas Bucher, ‘La dimen­
sion sociale du droit international privé’ (2009) 
341 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy 
of International Law 9, 246). Thus, the incap­
acity to remarry is regarded as a core effect of 
marriage in all legal systems which do not allow 
polygamy; by contrast, the spouses’ rights to → 
matrimonial property and inheritance, although 
very frequently granted, are not always perceived 
as essential consequences of marriage. It follows 
that internal consistency is more directly threat­
ened when opposite decisions on the existence 
or validity of legal status relate to its core effects 
rather than when ‘ancillary’ effects are at stake. 
Thus, when a marriage is void under the law 
designated by choice­ of­ law rules of the forum 
but valid under a lex causae approach, it would 
be nevertheless problematic to allow one of the 
spouses to remarry. By contrast, under the same 
circumstances it would be more acceptable that 
the same marriage confers some inheritance 
rights to the surviving spouse.
IV. The main arguments for the lex causae 
approach (dependent connection)
Notwithstanding the strengths of the lex fori 
approach, very important arguments can also 
be put forward for the lex causae approach (for a 
detailed analysis, see Carmen Christina Bernitt, 
Die Anknüpfung von Vorfragen im europäis-
chen Kollisionsrecht (Mohr Siebeck 2010) 36 et 
seq; Torben Svenné Schmidt, ‘The Incidental 
Question in Private international law’ (1992) 
233 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy 
of International Law, 305, 368 et seq). In the 
absence of compelling reasons for an independ­
ent connection, these arguments should be put 
in the balance with the need for internal con­
sistency and can justify, in some instances, the 
choice for a dependent connection.
1. International harmony of decisions
One of the main arguments for the lex causae 
is undoubtedly the quest for international har­
mony of decisions (or international uniformity). 
It is clear that the application of a foreign law to 
the main question under the choice­ of­ law rules 
of the forum, is meant to promote uniformity, a 
goal that is attained, in particular, when the lex 
causae is also applicable to that question under 
its own choice­ of­ law rules. However, uniform­
ity is jeopardized if  the forum courts take, on 
the incidental question, a diverging decision 
that would be rendered under the foreign lex 
causae. The dependant connection avoids this, 
thus promoting a harmonious result.
Criticism is sometimes levied against this rea­
soning. Several scholars note that international 
decisional harmony is an ideal objective, which 
is often practically unattainable (Paul Lagarde, 
‘La règle de conflit applicable aux questions pré­
alables’ [1960] Rev.crit.DIP 459, 467 et seq). In 
situations that give rise to incidental questions, 
it happens that the laws of more than two states 
are involved, and that these provide for differ­
ent solutions; then, complete uniformity cannot 
be achieved. Moreover, harmony of decisions 
does not only depend on the determination of 
the applicable law, but on several other factors, 
including the possibly diverging assessment of 
the disputed facts. Therefore, the importance of 
international uniformity of the applicable law 
should not be overestimated. These consider­
ations are not unfounded, and they explain why 
the quest for international uniformity should 
not always prevail over the need for internal 
consistency. Therefore, a general preference for 
the lex causae approach cannot be based on the 
quest for uniformity.
Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that uni­
formity is one of the important goals of private 
international law. In particular it constitutes 
one of the main reasons why states accept, in 
international situations, to apply foreign laws 
or to recognize foreign decisions. As it has been 
frequently noted, international harmony pro­
motes legal certainty, avoids limping relation­
ships and limits forum shopping (→ Forum 
(and law) shopping). Therefore, the search for 
uniformity is an important factor when deter­
mining the way to deal with an incidental ques­
tion. Its weight depends on various factors.
On one hand, uniformity is clearly more 
important in some private international systems 
and in some areas of law than in others.
Thus, the fact that the private international 
law system of the forum follows the renvoi 
doctrine in general or in the specific area of 
law covered by the dispute reflects a clear pro­
pensity to search for international harmony. 
This is certainly not conclusive per se, but 
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constitutes a significant indication in favour 
of the lex causae approach. This indication 
is even stronger when all kinds of renvoi are 
accepted (not only ‘Rückverweisung’, but also 
‘Weiterverweisung’), and in particular when 
situations of ‘cross- references’ (‘chassé- croisé’) 
are solved by resorting to the so­ called ‘foreign 
court doctrine’. By contrast, the fact that ren-
voi is rejected (in general terms or in the spe­
cific area), is a very strong indication against 
the lex causae approach: why should the courts 
of the forum state strive for a uniform solu­
tion of the incidental question, if  the lex fori 
shows no real interest in a uniform solution of 
the main question? (Carmen Christina Bernitt, 
Die Anknüpfung von Vorfragen im europäischen 
Kollisionsrecht (Mohr Siebeck 2010) 75).
On the other hand, uniformity is more 
important when it can be concretely achieved 
in the case at hand. First as mentioned, there 
are good reasons to consider that the problem 
of the incidental question does not even arise 
when the lex causae is not applicable to the 
main question under the choice­ of­ law rules of 
that law: in such a case it is clear that uniform­
ity will not be achieved such that a dependent 
connection of the incidental question does not 
make much sense. Second, international uni­
formity can more easily be achieved when only 
two legal orders are concerned, ie the lex fori 
and the lex causae, than in the presence of sev­
eral interested states. Thus, if  under the choice­ 
of­ law rules of the law applicable to the main 
question, the incidental question is governed by 
the substantive rules of the lex causae, interna­
tional uniformity can easily be attained if  the 
courts in the forum state are ready to follow 
that solution, renouncing the application of the 
domestic substantive rules, which would apply 
under a → lex fori approach. By contrast, if  
a third state also comes into play (because its 
law is designated to govern the incidental ques­
tion by the choice­ of­ law rules of either the lex 
fori or of the lex causae, or because its courts 
have decided on the incidental question by a 
judgment, which is recognized in only one of 
the other two states concerned) a complete uni­
formity cannot be achieved, and the weight of 
this argument is clearly reduced (Paul Lagarde, 
‘La règle de conflit applicable aux questions 
préalables’ [1960] Rev.crit.DIP 459, 467 et seq).
International uniformity is also particu­
larly important when the choice of rules gov­
erning the main question have been unified 
by virtue of an international convention or a 
European regulation. In such cases, several 
commentators plead for the adoption of the 
lex causae approach (Torger W Wienke, Zur 
Anknüpfung der Vorfrage bei international-
privatrechtlichen Staatsverträgen (Verlag für 
Standesamtswesen 1977) 195; Christian Heinze, 
‘Bausteine eines Allgemeinen Teils des europäis­
chen Internationalen Privatrechts’ in Dietmar 
Baetge, Jan von Hein and Michael von Hinden 
(eds), Die richtige Ordnung – Festschrift für Jan 
Kropholler (Mohr Siebeck 2008)  112; Hans 
Jürgen Sonnenberger, ‘Randbemerkungen zum 
Allgemeinen Teil eines europäisierten IPR’ in 
Dietmar Baetge, Jan von Hein and Michael von 
Hinden (eds), Die richtige Ordnung – Festschrift 
für Jan Kropholler (Mohr Siebeck 2008)  241). 
However, it has been correctly pointed out 
that  – at least when renvoi is excluded  – uni­
form private international law instruments only 
promote international harmony among the 
contracting states (or the EU Member States), 
but not necessarily with respect to third states 
(Carmen Christina Bernitt, Die Anknüpfung von 
Vorfragen im europäischen Kollisionsrecht (Mohr 
Siebeck 2010)  467 et seq). Unification of the 
choice­ of­ law rules is therefore not conclusive 
for the adoption of a lex causae approach.
2. Deference for the foreign lex causae
A further argument sometimes invoked in 
favour of a dependent connection is the need 
to respect the foreign lex causae and to apply 
it consistently. If  the choice­ of­ law rules of the 
forum refer to the law of a foreign country for 
the decision on the main question, all conditions 
set up by the foreign substantive rules should 
be construed and applied as they would be in 
the courts of the foreign country. Following 
this reasoning, the incidental question raised by 
those rules should also be decided in conform­
ity with the choice­ of­ law rules and the recogni­
tion rules of the lex causae (Paul Lagarde, ‘La 
règle de conflit applicable aux questions préala­
bles’ [1960] Rev.crit.DIP 459, 470 et seq; Torben 
Svenné Schmidt, ‘The Incidental Question in 
Private international law’ (1992) 233 Collected 
Courses of the Hague Academy of International 
Law, 305, 369 et seq).
It is certainly desirable that the foreign lex 
causae be applied exactly as it would in the 
courts of the relevant foreign state. However, 
this goal is not sufficient to impose a lex causae 
approach, in particular if  this leads to inconsist­
encies within the legal system of the forum. As 
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a matter of fact, there are other instances where 
the foreign law designated by the choice­ of­ law 
rule of the forum is not applied exactly as it 
should be: this is the case when the courts of the 
forum ‘adapt’ the foreign rules in order to avoid 
inconsistencies, or when they refuse to apply a 
specific rule of the foreign law because it would 
result in a violation of the forum’s public policy. 
It goes even further when the → renvoi doctrine 
is not accepted by the forum state, since the for­
eign lex causae is then applied notwithstanding 
the fact that it would not be applicable under its 
own criteria. These examples show that the def­
erence for a foreign applicable law is not with­
out limits. It should also be noted that in private 
international law, separate aspects of one single 
relationship are commonly ‘split’ among differ­
ent laws (eg the specific effects of a marriage 
such as the spouses’ name, their personal rela­
tionships and the matrimonial property, are 
often regulated by different laws). Therefore, 
the fact that the main question is governed by 
a law does not necessarily imply that the same 
law should also govern the incidental question.
One could also contend that the consistency 
of  the lex causae is not really threatened by the 
independent connection. It can happen that 
the lex causae itself  refers to a foreign law for 
the decision on the incidental question. If  this 
is the case, it impliedly accepts that the effects 
of  its own substantive law rules attach to a 
legal status or relationship, which is not val­
idly constituted under its domestic law rules. 
In this case, there is no particular need to pre­
serve the consistency between the substantive 
rules applicable, respectively, to the incidental 
question and to the main question. Thus, it is 
acceptable that the effects of  the substantive 
rules of  the lex causae attach to a legal status 
or relationship, which is valid under the law of 
the forum.
The argument based on respect for the lex 
causae is certainly stronger when, under that 
law, the incidental question would be gov­
erned – as the main question – by the substan­
tive rules of the lex causae. In this case, there 
is an intrinsic connection between the rules 
governing the main question and the incidental 
question, and this should be taken into account. 
The need to respect the lex causae is probably 
even stronger when the lex fori approach would 
lead to recognition of the validity of a legal sta­
tus or relationship that is contrary to the pub­
lic policy of the lex causae. In such a case, the 
decision on the incidental question would be 
in open contradiction with the rationale of the 
substantive rules of the lex causae.
3. Absence of a forum interest
As a further justification for a lex causae approach, 
it has been argued that the forum state does not 
have a real interest in applying its own choice­ of­ 
law rules to the incidental question (Paul Lagarde, 
‘La règle de conflit applicable aux questions 
préalables’ [1960] Rev.crit.DIP 459, 468 et seq). 
According to this opinion, the fact that the main 
question is subject to a foreign law indicates that 
the forum state is not directly concerned with the 
decision to be taken on that question; a fortiori 
there is no interest of the forum state in imposing 
the application of its own choice­ of­ law rules to a 
question, which only arises incidentally and for the 
sole purpose of answering the main question.
It is certainly true that under certain circum­
stances the incidental question does not present 
any substantial connection with the forum state 
and can only arise before the courts of that state 
because they are seized with the main ques­
tion. In such circumstances, the interest of the 
forum in the decision of the incidental ques­
tion may appear very limited and the applica­
tion of the law designated by its choice­ of­ law 
rules improper. This is so, in particular, when the 
disputed question could not even be the main 
object of proceedings in the forum because the 
local courts would lack jurisdiction. In that 
case, the application of the law designated by 
the choice­ of­ law rules of the forum is not really 
justified (see Georges AL Droz, ‘Regards sur le 
droit international privé comparé’ (1991) 229 
Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of 
International Law 9, 361 et seq).
However, this is not always true. In particu­
lar, the fact that a foreign law is applicable to the 
main question does not always imply a lack of 
interest of the forum state.
On one hand, contrary to some American 
theories, state interests are not always para­
mount for the determination of the applicable 
law. It is widely recognized that other considera­
tions also play an important role, in particular 
the desire to apply a law that is close and famil­
iar to the parties. Therefore, the reference to a 
foreign law does not imply a lack of interest of 
the forum state.
On the other hand, even if  one accepts that – 
at least under certain circumstances – the forum 
state is not directly interested in the outcome of 
the dispute over the main question, this does 
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not exclude that it might well be interested in 
the decision on the incidental question. This 
may be so because the incidental question is 
much more closely connected to the forum state 
(eg when the inheritance rights in a foreign 
estate depend on the validity of a local mar­
riage) and/ or because it raises policy considera­
tions which are more sensitive in the perspective 
of that state (eg the inheritance rights depend 
on the recognition of → same­ sex marriages).
V. The main arguments for a  
‘result- oriented’ solution
In light of the difficulty to opt for a general 
solution, some scholars have suggested to adopt 
a result­ oriented approach to the incidental 
question (Kurt Siehr, ‘Die rechtliche Stellung 
von Kindern aus hinkenden Ehen – Zur alter­
nativen Anknüpfung der Vorfrage in favorem 
legitimitatis’ (1971) StAZ 205, 212; Rhona 
Schuz, A Modern Approach to the Incidental 
Question (Springer Netherland 1997) 68 et seq).
In many choice­ of­ law systems, the tradi­
tional ‘jurisdiction­ selecting’ rules have been 
replaced in certain areas of law by ‘result­ 
oriented’ rules, which have as their purpose to 
favour the achievement of a certain substantive 
result in accordance with a specific policy of the 
forum. Thus, in the area of parent– child rela­
tionships, the choice­ of­ law rules often provide 
for alternative connections. This means that 
among several potentially applicable laws, the 
court may select the one which is more consist­
ent with the purpose of establishing a parent– 
child relationship or, when relevant, the child’s 
legitimacy. It has been suggested that a similar 
approach should also be adopted for incidental 
questions, with the consequence that the lex fori 
approach and a lex causae approach could be 
applied on an alternative basis in order to pro­
mote a certain desired substantive result.
Much can be said in favour of a result­ oriented 
approach. In the absence of generally accepted 
solutions to the problem of the incidental ques­
tion, it is reasonable to prefer an approach that 
is consistent with the existing choice­ of­ law rules 
of the forum. Therefore, when the choice­ of­ law 
rules of the forum state are based on a clear 
policy option, a result­ oriented approach should 
be undoubtedly preferred.
On one hand, this is the case when the forum 
choice­ of­ law rules applicable to the inciden­
tal question are result  oriented. Let us assume 
that the court is seized with the question of 
determining a child’s inheritance rights and 
that the forum choice­ of­ law rules regarding 
filiation are based on the ‘favor filiationis’ prin­
ciple. This means that, where the establishment 
of the  parent– child link constitutes the main 
question, it can potentially be regulated by 
one of several laws applicable on an alterna­
tive basis. Such a method should be extended to 
the solution of the incidental question with the 
consequence that the court should be allowed 
to select, between the lex fori approach and the 
lex causae approach, the one which fosters the 
creation of a parent– child relationship. The fact 
that the choice­ of­ law rules regarding the main 
question (ie succession) are not result  oriented 
should not rule out this result.
In practice, this approach results in adding, 
to the alternative connections provided for by 
the choice­ of­ law rules of the forum, the possible 
solution (or solutions) based on the choice­ of­ 
law or the recognition rules of the lex causae. 
Assuming that the question of the parent– child 
link is governed, under the lex fori, either by 
the national law or by the law of the habitual 
residence of the child, and that under the law of 
a parent’s last domicile (applicable to the suc­
cession), the same question is governed by the 
national law or the law of the habitual residence 
of the parents, the proposed ‘oriented’ solution 
would be to take into account all of these alter­
native connections. In the end, the existence of 
the parent– child relationship would be accepted 
if it is validly constituted under (at least) one of 
the mentioned laws.
On the other hand, a similar approach could 
also be adopted when the forum choice­ of­ law 
rules applicable to the main question (as opposed 
those applicable to the incidental question) are 
result  oriented. If this is the case, several laws 
are potentially applicable to the main question 
under the choice­ of­ law rules of the forum. In this 
framework, it makes sense to favour the intended 
result by allowing the court to decide the dilemma 
of the incidental question in a way that is con­
sistent with the goal of those rules. Thus, if the 
incidental question of the validity of a marriage 
must be decided for the purpose of establishing 
a child’s legitimacy, the court should be able to 
select, between the law applicable under the lex 
fori approach and the law applicable under the 
lex causae approach, the one that upholds the 
validity of the marriage. The fact that the forum 
choice­ of­ law rules for the incidental question (ie 
the marriage validity) are not themselves result 
oriented should not exclude this solution.
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In both cases, the relevant forum policy (‘favor 
filiationis’ or ‘favor legitimitatis’) should pre­
vail over the other considerations mentioned 
above (under points III.  and IV.), because this 
reflects the rationale of the choice­ of­ law rules 
of the forum.
By contrast, a result­ oriented approach to 
the incidental question would be ill founded 
when the choice­ of­ law rules of the forum (both 
those for the main question and those for the 
incidental question) are not result oriented. For 
instance, if  the question of the validity of the 
marriage arises as an incidental question in a 
succession case, it would not be appropriate 
to select the solution which favours the valid­
ity of the marriage if  the choice­ of­ law rules 
regarding both the succession and the validity 
of marriage are not result  oriented. In such a 
case an a priori choice in favour of the validity 
or invalidity of the disputed legal status or rela­
tionship cannot be founded on a specific policy 
of forum law.
One should consider that a result­ oriented 
approach affects the interests of the parties 
involved. This can only be justified if it reflects a 
specific forum policy. In our last example, a rule 
oriented towards upholding the validity of the 
deceased’s marriage would affect the interests of 
other competing heirs (children, parents, other 
relatives). If such a policy is not reflected in the 
choice of law of the forum, then there is no suf­
ficient reason for basing the solution of the inci­
dental questions on such a policy.
In particular, and contrary to one author’s 
suggestion (Rhona Schuz, A Modern Approach 
to the Incidental Question (Springer Netherland 
1997) 68 et seq), we consider that it would be 
too much of a stretch to infer the principles 
for a result­ oriented solution of the incidental 
question directly from the substantive rules and 
policies of the forum.
VI. Some suggestions for an empirical  
approach
As it appears from the previous remarks, no 
abstract preference for a general solution to 
the problem of the incidental question can be 
directly inferred from the arguments invoked by 
the proponents of one or the other approach. 
This does not mean that the decision should 
always be taken on a case­ by­ case basis. Under 
certain circumstances, certain solutions should 
be clearly preferred. When these do not apply, 
the decision will ultimately be in the judge’s 
discretion; nevertheless some guidance can be 
inferred from the arguments mentioned above.
1. A priori solutions
First of all, it is important to recall that in 
some instances the problem of the incidental 
question does not even arise. Besides purely 
domestic instances and those in which the main 
question is governed by the lex fori, we will also 
mention the cases in which the law designated 
by the forum to govern the main question is 
not applicable to that question under its own 
choice­ of­ law rules. In all of these situations, 
it is clear that the law applicable to the inci­
dental question should be determined under the 
choice­ of­ law rules of the forum.
The problem can be easily solved when the 
courts in the forum state are bound by a pre­
vious decision with res judicata effect between 
the parties. This is obviously the case when the 
now­ incidental question was previously decided 
as the main question in a judgment rendered 
in the forum state: the res judicata principle 
takes priority over the choice­ of­ law rules of 
the forum. The same is also true when the pre­
vious judgment has exceptionally decided an 
incidental question with res judicata effect. In 
our opinion, the res judicata effect should also 
prevail when the previous judgment was ren­
dered abroad, provided that it is recognized in 
the forum state (ex lege or following a regis­
tration procedure). In this case, the recognition 
rules of the lex fori prevail over its choice­ of­ law 
rules; a fortiori, they will take precedence over 
the diverging solutions possibly inferred from 
the lex causae.
Of course, the extension of res judicata will 
depend on the civil procedure rules of the state 
where the decision has been rendered (forum 
state or foreign state of origin). Normally, the 
res judicata effect is restricted to the parties of 
the previous proceedings. Therefore, the existence 
of a previous decision does not always bind the 
court, which is presently seized with the inciden­
tal question. However, one should consider that 
the notion of ‘parties’ normally also includes the 
heirs and other successors of the parties.
Failing a decision with res judicata effect 
between the parties, a result­ oriented approach 
should be followed whenever the forum choice­ 
of­ law rules applicable either to the incidental 
question or to the main question are themselves 
result oriented. As argued above, when a clear 
preference for a specific result can be inferred 
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from the choice of rules of the forum, this 
principle of preference should also be followed 
when deciding on the incidental question. The 
substantive goal reflected by the choice­ of­ law 
rules should prevail over the arguments invoked 
for a lex fori approach or a lex causae approach.
In the absence of a clear result­ oriented solu­
tion based on the forum choice­ of­ law rules, 
the lex fori approach should in principle be 
preferred when the legal status or relationship, 
which forms the object of the incidental ques­
tion, was validly created or constituted in the 
forum state. In such a case, a diverging deci­
sion on the incidental question will openly con­
tradict a previous act of the forum authorities. 
Although the court seized with the incidental 
question can, in theory, opt for a lex causae 
approach, it seems very unlikely that  – in the 
absence of a clear policy goal to that effect – the 
court will sacrifice the internal consistency of 
the domestic legal order in order to pursue the 
uncertain objective of international harmony 
of decisions.
The court will have to reach a similar result 
even if  the disputed legal status or relationship 
was created or constituted abroad, provided 
that higher principles of European or inter­
national law  – such as the freedom of move­
ment inside the EU or the respect for family life 
under the ECHR  – require its recognition, or 
the recognition of some of its specific effects, 
in the forum.
2. Case- by- case approach
The criteria mentioned above will help to solve a 
significant number of cases. In the residual situ­
ations, we think that no clear preference between 
a lex fori approach and a lex causae approach 
can be formulated in abstracto. As the doctrinal 
debate clearly shows, strong arguments can be 
raised in favour of both prevailing approaches 
and their respective weight changes with the cir­
cumstances of the case. Courts are also reluc­
tant to adopt clear­ cut solutions and prefer to 
benefit from a measure of discretion in order to 
reach a just result in each individual case.
Although a case­ by­ case approach is nor­
mally not in line with the goal of legal certainty, 
we do not believe that the risk of unpredict­
able results should be overestimated (con-
tra: Carmen Christina Bernitt, Die Anknüpfung 
von Vorfragen im europäischen Kollisionsrecht 
(Mohr Siebeck 2010) 89 et seq). First of all, the 
problem of the incidental question only arises in 
a very limited number of cases, and the princi­
ples mentioned above further reduce the number 
of uncertain situations. Moreover, predictability 
is, in any case, extremely difficult to ensure in cir­
cumstances where incidental questions arise: in 
fact, even if  a specific and uniform approach 
to incidental questions is adopted, the decision 
will, in any case, depend on which court is seized 
with the main proceedings and on which law is 
applicable to the main question under the forum 
choice­ of­ law rules. Since these circumstances 
are generally difficult to foresee, the predict­
ability of the final decision is, in any case, not 
completely granted. Finally, based on the argu­
ments discussed above, guidance can be given to 
the court in order to increase predictability. In 
particular, we think that the following criteria 
should be taken into account:
First, the choice between a lex fori approach or 
a lex causae approach will depend on the empha­
sis placed, by the private international law system 
of the forum state, on international uniformity 
of decisions, in particular in the dispute’s specific 
area of law. The assessment of this should be 
based on the content of the choice­ of­ law rules 
of the forum. In particular, the attitude towards 
renvoi is very significant in this respect. The fact 
that the renvoi doctrine is accepted reveals a clear 
propensity for the search of uniform solutions, in 
particular when all kinds of renvoi are taken into 
account in the forum. The adherence to the so­ 
called ‘foreign court theory’ is an even stronger 
indication that uniformity with the foreign lex 
causae is an important goal for the forum state. 
This is not sufficient in itself to impose a lex 
causae approach to the incidental question, but it 
certainly favours it. By contrast, the fact that the 
renvoi doctrine is excluded clearly indicates that 
international uniformity is not a priority for the 
forum; therefore, there is no particular reason to 
follow a lex causae approach.
A second factor is the probability that the 
incidental question will be raised – as a main 
question or again incidentally – in separate pro­
ceedings before the courts in the forum state. As 
explained above, the main reason to favour the 
lex fori approach is to avoid inconsistent deci­
sions on the same question in the forum state. 
The weight of this argument is clearly reduced 
when, in the light of the circumstances, the risk of 
such inconsistent decisions is low or nonexistent.
This can result from the fact that the disputed 
legal status or relationship does not present sig­
nificant contacts to the forum. Several scholars 
stress that this aspect can sometimes justify the 
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choice in favour of a lex causae approach. In the 
absence of sufficient connections to the forum, 
it may even be that the courts in that country 
would not have jurisdiction to decide on the dis­
puted question as the main question. Under such 
circumstances there seems to be no compelling 
reason for deciding the incidental question under 
the choice­ of­ law rules of the forum.
The risk of inconsistent decisions can also 
be influenced by other circumstances which de 
facto exclude or reduce the possibility of further 
proceedings on the same question in the forum. 
Thus, once the alleged parent is dead, there is 
no real risk that the question of the existence 
of a parent– child relationship will arise oth­
erwise than in proceedings concerning the → 
succession.
A third aspect to consider is the more or 
less close relationship existing between the 
main question and the incidental question. As 
explained above, the main question can some­
times be seen as belonging to the ‘core’ effects 
of the legal status or relationship which consti­
tutes the incidental question (eg the inability to 
remarry is clearly a core effect of a marriage). 
In such a case, it is more difficult for the courts 
to deviate from the application of the forum 
choice­ of­ law rules and follow the lex causae 
approach. If  a legal status or relationship is 
valid under the choice­ of­ law rules of the forum 
it cannot be devoid of its core effects by simply 
referring to the lex causae. On the same lines, 
it is difficult to recognize such core effects to a 
relationship that does not validly exist under 
choice­ of­ law rules of the forum. By contrast, 
the lex causae approach can more easily be fol­
lowed when the main question does not belong 
to the core effects of the disputed status or rela­
tionship. This is, for instance, the case when the 
main question turns on a person’s surname: 
since the link between the name and the exist­
ence of a certain family status (→ marriage, 
divorce (→ Divorce and personal separation), 
filiation), albeit important, is not so close, we 
can more easily accept that the person’s name 
will conform to the foreign lex causae even if  
this does not correspond to the person’s sta­
tus under the choice­ of­ law rules of the forum 
(Andreas Bucher, ‘La dimension sociale du 
droit international privé’ (2009) 341 Collected 
Courses of the Hague Academy of International 
Law 9 (246 et seq); see also the decision of the 
German Federal Court of Justice (BGH), 15 
February 1984 [1986] IPRax 35).
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